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THE APPLICATION OF QUASI-CONTRACTUAL
LIABILITY AGAINST A PUBLIC ENTITY
Under present California law a municipal corporation or other
public entity may incur contractual liability only in the manner prescribed by applicable statutory or charter requirements.'
A private
party who has contracted with a public agency is entitled to the agreed
consideration only if the public officials involved were authorized to
enter into the agreement. Where there has been a failure to comply
with a requirement of competitive bidding, the agreement, which would
otherwise have been valid, is deemed illegal and unenforceable. As a
result, the private party cannot recover the reasonable value of the
benefit conferred 2 though the public entity is allowed to retain at least
what has been incorporated into its own property.
Since its decision in Zottman v. City and County of San Francisco,'
the California Supreme Court has followed this rule which practice
has proven painful to many a private party dealing with a public entity. The purpose of this note is to examine the rationale for this severe
position and to question its applicability in 1972. This note will also
explore methods of allowing relief in situations similar to Zottman
without nullifying legislation designed to limit the contractual power
of public entites and to protect the public interest.
The Zottman Decision
Zottman held that since the contract was invalid because of noncompliance with city charter bidding requirements, no claim could be
made against the municipality despite its acceptance and retention of
the benefits received from the contractor. The original contract, which
was let in accordance with charter requirements, provided for certain
improvements to be made on San Francisco city property known as
Portsmouth Square. Part of the work called for was the construction
1. Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 291 P. 839
(1930); see 10 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.02, at 215
(3d ed. rev. vol. 1966) [hereinafter cited as McQUILLIN].
2. 10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, at 215-17.
3. 20 Cal. 96 (1862). This rule has been applied, at the expense of private
contractors, in favor of school districts, counties, and municipalities. See, e.g., Miller
v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1942); Reams v. Cooley, 171 Cal. 150,
152 P. 293 (1915); Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal.
App. 149, 187 P. 163 (1919); Clinton Constr. Co. v. Clay, 34 Cal. App. 625, 168 P.
588 (1917).
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of an iron fence around the square. The problem arose when the
city's authorized representatives ordered the contractor to perform some
additional work; namely, to construct a more durable stone base and to
paint the iron fence to prevent corrosion. The contractor, in the presence of various city officials, was assured that he would be compensated
for this work. The city did not, however, solicit competitive bids in authorizing this extra work, in direct violation of charter requirements. 4
Upon the subsequent refusal of the city to pay for the additional work,
the contractor filed suit to recover for its value.
Chief Justice Field, ruling in favor of the city, explained that the
city could only bind itself by a contract made in the manner prescribed
by its charter. The court refused to recognize a request not made in
compliance with the charter and held that no obligation to pay for the
benefit could arise absent such a request. Thus, the retention of the
extra work was immaterial since it was deemed to be unsolicited. 5
The contractor involved conceded the city had no authority to
contract for the extra work. He founded his basis for recovery on two
other theories: (1) a presumption of ratification of the additional work
existed because individual members of the city council were aware of
the request and voiced no opposition; (2) the municipality had received
the benefit of the extra work and was liable on the basis of an implied
contract. 6
Dealing with his first contention, the court explained that the charter is the source of all power exercisable by a city on a given subject.
It gave the city council exclusive authority to contract for public improvements and expressly prescribed the mode for so doing. Thus, the
individual council members had no power to authorize the work but
could only do so collectively via the passage of an ordinance awarding
the contract to the lowest bidder.7 Since specific requirements had
been ignored in Zottman, the agreement could not be subsequently affirmed. To allow the municipality to confirm the illegal and void
contract would in effect repeal the charter requirement of competitive
bidding. The court reasoned further that to allow such ratification
would enable public authorities to do retroactively what they could not
do originally.' Granting the power of ratification would imply the
power to have made a contract in a similar manner, and the law will
4. The requirements of the charter, which was replaced in 1932, included the
passage of an ordinance for each improvement and the letting of the contract to the
lowest bidder after due notice in public journals. See 20 Cal. at 101.
5. Id. at 104, 106-07.
6. Id. at 100.
7. Id. at 101.
8. Id. at 103.
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not imply a duty to do that which it will not allow the party to agree to
do.9
The court dismissed the contractor's second contention holding
that the theory of implied liability for the benefit retained was not applicable. It reasoned that since the request for the additional work was
made in an unauthorized manner, the work had been, in effect, performed without any request. It compared the instant case with one
where an individual constructed a building on another's land without
his request. In such a case, the owner need not accept or ratify the improvement nor compensate the builder for the unsolicited work. Thus,
in the situation at hand, no obligation to pay could arise since the city
had not requested the benefit, and since it had been incorporated into
city property, there was no duty to return it in species. 10
The denial of liability in Zottman was based on the court's refusal
to allow the subsequent ratification of an illegal contract and its finding
that no obligation could arise absent a request for the benefit. Treating the benefit conferred as unsolicited, equitable estoppel was not available. The validity of these findings rests upon the premise that where
there has been a failure to comply with the statutory requirement of
competitive bidding, the agreement attempted to be made is wholly beyond the scope of public authority. Although the California Supreme
Court has acknowledged that implied liability may be applicable against
the public entity where general power to contract exists, it has not been
applied where a specific statutory requirement such as competitive
bidding has been violated."'
The purpose of competitive bidding requirements is to protect the
taxpayer from the dissipation of public funds by public agencies via
fraudulent or frivolous agreements, 1 2 and to secure, through competition, the highest quality work at the least cost."3 Relying on Zotiman,
California courts have reasoned that the allowance of quasi-contractual
relief to prevent unjust enrichment would undercut such legislation designed to regulate the contractual power of public bodies.' 4 These
courts have charged people dealing with a public body with the knowledge of any and all limitations imposed on it by charter or statute.
Such people act at their peril that enabling requirements, such as competitive bidding, have been complied with.'"
9. Id. at 105.
10. Id. at 106-07.
11. Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 91, 124 P.2d 34, 39 (1942).
12. Id. at 88, 124 P.2d at 37; Zottman v. City and County of San Francisco,
20 Cal. 96, 101 (1862).
13.

10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 29.29, at 321.

14. See, e.g., Reams v. Cooley, 171 Cal. 150, 157, 152 P. 293, 295 (1915);
Greer v. Hitchcock, 271 Cal. App. 2d 334, 336, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (1969).
15. Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 89, 124 P.2d 34, 38 (1942); accord,
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Although Zottman is still the law of California, its rationale has
rarely been examined in subsequent decisions. Such decisions instead
have somewhat blindly followed its precepts and continue to absolve
the public entity from any form of liability. 6 Recently, Zottman was
cited as controlling in Greer v. Hitchcock.17 After being awarded the
contract for construction of a drainage system for Contra Costa
County, the contractor discovered that due to his clerical error $22,000
had been omitted from the bid. Addition of this amount to his original
bid would have left the figure $10,000 below the next bid. Citing
Zottman as the leading case,' the court of appeals held that the contractor could recover only the amount of the original bid since only the
original contract had been let in accordance with statutory requirements.1 Thus, absent compliance with competitive bidding requirements, one conferring a benefit on a public entity at present has no
remedy in California to recover the reasonable value thereof.
Zottman Rejects Established Principles of Governmental
Contractual Liability
Immunity is the Exception

In absolving San Francisco from implied liability, Zottman held
that the city was immune from the established doctrines of ratification,
estoppel, and quasi-contractual liability. This immunity appears to rest
upon the underlying premise that agreements made without required
competitive bidding are wholly outside the scope of public authority.
This premise was inconsistent with earlier decisions20 and has been
City of Pasadena v. Estrin, 212 Cal. 231, 235, 298 P. 14, 16 (1931); Reams v. Cooley,
171 Cal. 150, 157, 152 P. 293, 295-96 (1915); Greer v. Hitchcock, 271 Cal. App. 2d
334, 337, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (1969).
16. Compare Zottman v. City and County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96
(1862) with Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1942) and Los Angeles
Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 291 P. 839 (1930).
17. 271 Cal. App. 2d 334, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1969) (taxpayer action to recover payments made under invalid contract).
18. Id. at 336, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
19. See CAL. WATER CoDE App. § 69-29 (West 1968) which provides: "All
contracts for any improvement or unit of work when the cost thereof... will exceed
two thousand dollars ($2,000), shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders
in the manner hereinafter provided."
20. In Argenti v. City of San Francisco, 16 Cal. 255, 265-66 (1860), Justice Cope
stated: "It is well settled that the contracts of corporations stand upon the same
footing as those of natural persons, and depend upon the same circumstances for their
validity and effect. The doctrine of ratification and estoppel is as applicable to corporations as to individuals, and the former are bound by the acts of their agents in
the same manner and to the same extent, as the latter. There is no difference in this
respect between public and private corporations; for, in matters of contract, a public
corporation is regarded merely as a legal individual, and treated in all respects as a
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questioned and criticized in a number of courts within and outside of
California.
California has long recognized that a public entity should be held
to the same standard as a private individual and thus be unable to assert immunity, unless valid public policy considerations dictate otherwise. In Sacramento County v. Southern Pacific Co." the California
Supreme Court said:
[I]t is apparent that public corporations, like individuals, are bound
to act in good faith and deal justly; that they cannot be allowed to
enter into contracts involving others in expensive engagements, silently permit these contracts to be executed, and then repudiate
them because the statutory steps have not been pursued in the
letting of the contracts.
In Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed22 the court reiterated that "[w]hen
a municipal corporation engages in ordinary business transactions, such
as purchasing supplies, it exercises merely the right of a private corporation or natural person. . . ." And in San Francisco Gas Co. v. City
of San Francisco,23 Justice Field said that the obligation to do justice
rests equally upon a municipality as upon an individual. He considered it no defense that no ordinance had been passed on the subject
where the city had benefited from the property or labor of a party and
the implication of a promise to pay was equally applicable against the
city.
Indeed, the court in Zottman did not consider the limitations on
the principle of governmental immunity enunciated in the subsequent
cases. Quite possibility, Zottman has, in theory at least, been overruled
by these latter cases.
Ratification of Invalid Contracts
The liability of San Francisco was also excused in Zottman by
the court's rejection of the ability of the municipality to ratify an invalid
contract.24 This, however, is subject so some question today.
In Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed25 the Supreme Court of California recognized the subsequent ratification of an agreement which
had not complied with constitutional requirements.2 6 The city of Oakprivate person." But see Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1160 (1934).
21. 127 Cal. 217, 223-24, 59 P. 568, 570 (1899).
22. 139 Cal. 432, 436, 73 P. 189, 191 (1903); accord, Brown v. Town of
Sebastopol, 153 Cal. 704, 709, 96 P. 363, 365 (1908).
23. 9 Cal. 453, 469-70 (1858) (alternative holding).
24. See text accompanying notes 8 & 9 supra.
25. 139 Cal. 432, 73 P. 189 (1903).
26. The rationale for allowing the subsequent ratification of an invalid contract
was well stated in Adams v. Ziegler, 22 Cal. App. 2d 135, 138, 70 P.2d 537, 538
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land was held liable for the reasonable value of water furnished to it
during the year despite its failure to establish applicable rates. The
California Constitution required that, prior to each fiscal year, the city
pass an ordinance or resolution fixing water rates. While the validity
of a proposed rate was being litigated the city received water despite the
absence of an established rate. This decision upheld a subsequent compromise by the parties to compensate 2the
company at the rate which
7
was the subject of independent litigation.
The court saw no reason to deny payment of a reasonable value
of the water furnished as it was the city's responsibility to provide it.
It would not permit the city to retain and use the company's property
and then refuse to pay on the grounds that "it had not proceeded in
strict conformity with some part of the complicated internal machinery
of its complex corporate organization."2 8 To the contrary, when a
municipal corporation engages in ordinary business transactions
it is subject to the principle that after it has received the benefit of a
contract within the scope of its power to make it is estopped from
denying its validity in an action based upon such contract. 29
The court attempted to distinguish its holding from that of Zottman on three grounds: (1) in this case the city council had absolutely
approved the company's claims by the subsequent passage of an ordinance; (2) the charter did not absolutely prohibit the action taken by
the city council; and (3) here there was a continuous
use of property
30
throughout the year rather than one isolated instance.
The first ground relied on by the court is unsound because Zottman specifically denied a public entity the power of subsequent ratification." The second basis for distinction is hard to fathom. Logic
dictates that a violation of a constitutional requirement, as here, is a
stronger case for denial of any recovery than that of a mere charter
mandate, as was true in Zottman. The third point seems as illogical as
the first two. A benefit conferred in a single tranasaction might often
be greater than in a series of transactions. The availability of equitable relief should not hinge upon the length of time necessary to render
the performance called for by the contract.
(1937): "Regardless of the question of power to make the contracts it is sufficient
to say that the contracts were ratified by the council and the city accepted the benefits from them. The making of the contracts being within the powers of the city,
and the council having approved the presentation of the play and having ratified the
action of the commission, the city is not now in position to deny the validity of the
claims."
27. 139 Cal. at 434-35, 73 P. at 190-91.
28. Id. at 436, 73 P. at 191.
29. id.
30. Id. at 439, 73 P. at 192.
31. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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Unfortunately, the result of the lip service paid to Zottman in
Breed has been that subsequent decisions in this state have continually
referred to Zottman as authority in denying relief in similar factual situations. 32 In failing to overrule Zottman, the Breed court paved the way
for later decisions to ignore its actual holding that a municipality might
not deny the validity of a contract where a legitimate benefit, within its
power to acquire, has been conferred, and that subsequent ratification
is permissible. However, the court's clear holding that an invalid contract could be subsequently ratified substantially weakens any contention today that Zottman is valid law to the contrary.
Estoppel of the Public Entity
In treating the additional work as unsolicited, the Zottman court
failed to apply the traditional doctrine of estoppel against the city of
San Francisco. However, subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Court strongly suggest that estoppel might be available in similar
situations.
The application of estoppel against a public entity is not novel in
California. In Farrell v. County of Placer3" the Supreme Court of California held that estoppel was available where procedural steps had not
been followed, but not where a statute had been violated which was in
effect the "measure of the power" of the public entity. The court reaffirmed its refusal to apply estoppel where the effect would be to expand
the authority of the public entity.3 4 However, when determining
whether in fact an expansion of public authority would result from the
application of estoppel, the court's interpretation of the "measure of
35
the power" standard has been inconsistent.
In Sacramento County v. Southern Pacific Co. 6 the court held
that the county was estopped from denying the validity of the contract,
and at the same time rejected the claim that the contract was void because of the failure to get required plans and specifications or to solicit
competitive bids. The court stressed the fact that the county had the
general power to build the subject bridge and that the parties had acted
in good faith. In applying estoppel the court was not giving validity
32. See Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1942); Los Angeles
Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 291 P. 839 (1930); Reams v.
Cooley, 171 Cal. 150, 152 P. 293 (1915); Greer v. Hitchcock, 271 Cal. App. 2d 334,
76 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1969).
33. 23 Cal. 2d 624, 631, 145 P.2d 570, 573 (1944).
34. Boren v. State Personnel Bd., 37 Cal. 2d 634, 643, 234 P.2d 981, 986 (1951).
35. Compare Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1942) with
Sacramento County v. Southern Pac. Co., 127 Cal. 217, 59 P. 568 (1899).
36. 127 Cal. 217, 220-25, 59 P. 568, 569-71 (1899).
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to the agreement. Moreover, had the contract been executory it would
have been void.
In Miller v. McKinnon3 7 the court overruled this decision by reverting to the measure of the power standard in Zottman.3 8 The application of this standard in Zottman led to the court's conclusion that since
the council acted without authority in requesting the additional work,
no request in fact had been made. By resorting to this fiction the court
avoided dealing directly with the problem. Clearly there was a request
made for the extra work, albeit in an unauthorized manner. Rather
the issue should be not whether a request was made, but to what extent
the city should be held accountable for the action of its officials.
Quite recently in City of Long Beach v. Mansell39 the court squarely
acknowledged the conflicting doctrines which have led to such inconsistency in the application of equitable estoppel against a public entity. On the one hand there is the natural desire to avoid manifest injustice, and on the other, the wish to preserve the public interest.40 It
stated that the proper rule for applying estoppel against the government
was that it
may be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a
private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel against
a private party are present and. . . the injustice which would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension
to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the raising of an estoppel. 41
The court refused to allow the assertion that the city wholly lacked the
power to dispose of lands because it did possess such power under certain circumstances. 42 In applying estoppel against the city the court
stressed "the fact that the rare combination of government conduct and
extensive reliance here involved will create an extremely narrow precedent for application in future cases." 43 The court felt that
the great injustice which would result in this case from the failure
to uphold an equitable estoppel against the state and city justifies
the minimal effect upon public policy which would result from the
raising of such an estoppel-and therefore that this is one of those
37. 20 Cal. 2d 83, 90, 124 P.2d 34, 38 (1942).
38. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
39. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970). The court noted
the four elements essential to the application of equitable estoppel: (1) the party
estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) it must have intended to induce action on
the part of the other party; (3) the other party must have been ignorant of the true
facts; (4) the other party must have been injured by detrimental reliance. Id. at 489,
476 P.2d at 442, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
40. id. at 496, 476 P.2d at 448, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
41. Id. at 496-97, 476 P.2d at 448, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
42. Id. at 499, 476 P.2d at 450, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
43. Id. at 500, 476 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 51,
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'exceptional cases' where 'justice and right require' that the govern44
ment be bound by an equitable estoppel.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the Mansell court would no
longer uphold the decision in Zottman. It is difficult to imagine this
court holding that the city council in Zottman wholly lacked the power
to request the additional work. Where, as in Zottman, the public entity has received a legitimate benefit from an agreement entered voluntarily, the Mansell court would consistently estop the public entity from
denying the validity of such agreement. Indeed, Zottman appears to be
one of those "exceptional cases" where public policy does not justify
the burden inflicted upon the individual.
The Intra Ultra Vires Distinction
The failure of the court in Zottman to distinguish between intra
and ultra vires municipal power is the significant factor lending to the
court's ultimate disregard of traditional concepts of municipal liability.
An ultra vires contract is one "which is not within the power of a municipal corporation to make under any circumstances or for any purpose." 45

Zottman fails to distinguish the case where the public entity could in no
situation enter an agreement, the subject matter of which is outside the
scope of its power, from that where a binding agreement could have
been made had the antecedent conditions been performed. Since Zottman, however, there has developed extensive authority in California
which holds that in the latter situation implied liability may be imposed against the public entity.4 6

In Higgens v. San Diego Water Co.47 an agreement to lease a
waterworks plant was found invalid because it included a subsidy to a
railroad and thus was outside the scope of the city's authority. The
subject matter of the agreement, however, was held to be within city
power as
44. Id. at 501, 476 P.2d at 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
45.

10 MCQUILLIN, supra note 1, § 29.10, at 250; see Miner's Ditch Co. v.

Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543, 578 (1869).
46. A number of jurisdictions which have allowed a recovery where Zottman
did not have done so by explicitly distinguishing acts of a public entity as intra vires
and ultra vires. In Gamewell v. City of Phoenix, 216 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1954),
where there had been a failure to solicit required competitive bids, the Ninth Circuit, applying Arizona law, ruled that one must distinguish a contract which a city
had authority to enter but was invalid because of failure to follow the prescribed
method for so doing, from an ultra vires contract which the city could not enter
under any circumstances. Id. at 941; accord, Rieth-Riley v. Town of Indian Village,
138 Ind. App. 341, 347-48, 214 N.E.2d 208, 211 (1966); Kotschevar v. North Fork
Tp., 229 Minn. 234, 236-37, 39 N.W.2d 107, 109 (1949); Capital Bridge Co. v. Saunders County, 164 Neb. 304, 310, 83 N.W.2d 18, 22 (1957); Finch v. Matthews,
74 Wash. 2d 161, 172, 443 P.2d 833, 840 (1968).
47. 118 Cal. 524, 45 P. 824 (1897).
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the city had the general power to contract for a water supply for
itself and its inhabitants, and under this power could undoubtedly
have taken a lease of the water company's plant for a year ...
Its express contract . . . was invalid . . . but there is no reason

why it should not pay the reasonable
value of the use of the plant
48
which it has actually enjoyed.
The California Supreme Court cited Zottman in support of its conclusion while reaching a contrary result.49 The decision holds that where
the subject matter of the agreement is within the power of the city, the
city is liable for the reasonable value of the benefit conferred.
Evidently, numerous subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Cour 5 0 are ultimately based on the same proposition as the Higgens case. Consequently, it seems clear that because it was evident
that the additional work called for in Zottman was certainly within
the power of the city to authorize, 51 the Zottman decision does not reflect the true state of the law in California today which dictates
that a distinction between ultra and intra vires be drawn.
A primary factor in the court's failure to recognize the agreement
in Zottman as intra vires rather than ultra vires was its desire to avoid
the nullification of legislation designed to protect the taxpayer by means
of regulating the contractual power of public entities.52 Many cases
in California, however, have made such a distinction and have reached
a result contrary to Zottman. Given alternative means of protecting
the taxpayer, it is no longer necessary to regard an agreement which is
within the power of the public entity to make, but invalid for failure
to comply with statutory requirements, as ultra vires for policy reasons.
Zottman should, however, still correctly be applied where the agreement is truly ultra vires.53
Not only is the failure to make the intra-ultra vires distinction
unnecessary to protect the public interest but the consequences of this
failure may well be unconstitutional. Recently, in City of Long Beach
54 the California Supreme Court tolerated a degree of env. Mansel1
48. Id. at 555, 45 P. at 832. In Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 432,
436, 73 P. 189, 191 (1903), the court reiterated this distinction saying: "It is only
when the subject-matter of the contract is entirely outside the scope of the corporate
powers, or the contract in question is clearly prohibited, that the plea of ultra vires will
be listened to." Cf. Brown v. Town of Sebastopol, 153 Cal. 704, 709, 96 P. 363, 365
(1908); Wheeler v. City of Santa Ana, 81 Cal. App. 2d 811, 817, 185 P.2d 373, 377
(1947).
49. 118 Cal. at 555, 45 P. at 832.
50. See text accompaning notes 25-39 supra.
51. Compare Zottman V. City and County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96 (1862)
with Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 432, 73 P. 189 (1903) and Higgens
v. San Diego Water Co., 118 Cal. 524, 45 P. 824 (1897).
52. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
53. See text accompanying notes 45 & 46 supra.
54. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
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croachment upon public interest to avoid a much greater burden placed
upon the private party. Given the substantial burden imposed on the
contractor in Zottman its allowance of the retention of benefits without
payment of compensation might well contravene constitutional due
process requirements. 55 Under the test of State v. Marin Municipal
Water District5 6 the result might constitute a "taking" for which com57
pensation is required by the eminent domain provision of this state.
In Bacich v. Board of Control58 the court said "the policy underlying
the eminent domain provision in the Constitution is to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by
the making of public improvements."59
In Zottman a good faith mistake resulted in receipt by the city of a
valid public improvement. To say that the benefit received by the
public from denying any form of compensation, outweighs the burden
on the individual would seem to distort the meaning of "police
power."6
Rather, given the above purpose of the eminent domain
provision, it would appear that compensation is constitutionally required to charge the community rather than an individual with the cost
of such an improvement. Hence, any policy argument relied on in
Zottman in refusing to make a distinction between ultra and intra vires
contracts would seem unfounded.
Many cases such as Breed, Higgens, and Mansell, demonstrate the
inequity of the result of Zottman, and its harsh impact by making the
55. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
56. 17 Cal. 2d 699, 111 P.2d 651 (1941). The court held that: "The determination of whether a statute constitutes a taking of property without due process of
law or an impairment of the obligation of a contract consists in balancing the burden
placed on the individual or corporation on the one hand against the benefit which
will accrue to the public as a whole on the other. If the benefit to the public outweighs the burden on the individual, the statute is a valid exercise of the 'police
power'." Id. at 706, 111 P.2d at 655.
57. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 14 which provides: "Private property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been
made to. . . the owner ..
"
58. 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
59. Id. at 350, 144 P.2d at 823. It was found that the addition of "or damaged"
to the word "taken" in the eminent domain clause indicated an intention to apply the
provision to a variety of situations. While acknowledging that granting liberal compensation under the provision would increase the cost of public improvements, the
court felt that individual property rights should not be sacrificed to secure an improvement of the general public convenience.
Deploring the tendency to sacrifice the
individual to the community, no reason was found why the state should not pay for
property which it has taken. Id. at 350-51, 144 P.2d at 823.
60. In Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925),
it was held that police powers could be exercised only when "reasonably necessary to
promote the public health, safety, morals . . . or general welfare of the people of a
community."
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distinction between ultra and intra vires contracts. A similar awareness is evident in Lunden v. County of Los Angeles61 where the court
rather ingeniously applied California Civil Code section 163862 in
construing California Government Code section 2300663 and California
Constitution article IV, section 32.64 This application enabled an architect to recover a reasonable value for his services based on a reasonable
interpretation of the parties' contract.65 Citing Bohman v. Berg,66 the
court found it
impossible. . to escape the conclusion that the parties, both by
the inadequate language of their written agreement and by their actions taken thereunder, rather clearly indicated their understanding
and intention that
respondent eventually would be compensated for
67
these services.

A recent opinion by the California attorney general 6s may well be

motivated by a similar awareness of the problem. Its significance lies
in its indication that statutory competitive bidding requirements need
not always be followed in modifying existing contracts. The opinion,
contrary to Zottman, allows modification in accordance with the terms
of the contract, thus giving a public entity needed flexibility to deal with
61. 233 Cal. App. 2d 811, 43 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1965).
62. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1638 (West 1954) provides: "The language of a contract
is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does' not involve an absurdity."
63. CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 23006 (West 1968) provides: "Any contract, authorization, allowance, payment, or liability to pay, made or attempted to be made in violation of law, is void, and shall not be the foundation or basis of a claim against the
treasury of any county."
64. CAL. CONsr. art. IV, § 17 which replaced art. IV, § 32 in 1966, with no
material change, provides: "The Legislature has no power to grant, or to authorize a
city, county, or other public body to grant, extra compensation or extra allowance
to a public officer, public employee, or contractor after service has been rendered or a
contract has been entered into and performed in whole or in part, or to authorize the
payment of a claim against the State or a city, county, or other public body under an
agreement made without authority of law."
65. 233 Cal. App. 2d at 816, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
66. 54 Cal. 2d 787, 356 P.2d 185, 8 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1960). The court stated:
"It is well-settled law that, although an agreement may be indefinite or uncertain in its
inception, subsequent performance by the parties under the agreement will cure this
defect and render it enforceable. When one party performs under the contract and
the other party accepts his performance without objection it is assumed that this was
the performance contemplated by the agreement." Id. at 794-95, 356 P.2d at 190, 8 Cal.
Rptr. at 446.
67. 233 Cal. App. 2d at 816-17, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
68. 53 Op. CAL. Arr'y GEN. 72 (1970). The opinion stated that "[t]he State
is empowered by section 11010.5 of the Government Code to modify contracts; but in
the case of contracts entered into by the State pursuant to any statute requiring the
contract to be let on the basis of competitive bids, such modification is allowed only if
the contract or the law so provides." Id. at 73 (emphasis added); see generally 10
McQrnLiN, supra note 1, § 29.40, at 346-47.
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unpredictable or unforeseen occurences. Fortunately, the opinion does
such modification from appropriate tests of its legitinot immunize
69
macy.
Relief From Zottman-Quasi Contract
Because any policy reason that could be advanced in support of
the Zottman court's failure to distinguish between intra and ultra vires
contracts seems to be unfounded today,"0 the distinction should be
made in each case. The courts have effectively made the distinction in
many cases in any event." The remedy that should be applied in the
intra vires situation after the distinction has been made, is that of
quasi contract. Certain fears, however, have led courts to deny such
relief where the contract is illegal though the municipality has voluntarily entered into it, and the community has received a valuable benefit.
Primarily, courts have been reluctant to allow a municipal corporation to expand its own power by contract rather than by legislation. However, even assuming that a municipality would deliberately
seek to act without authority, the state has sufficient remedy by quo
warranto proceedings7 2 to punish the municipality and enjoin the continuation of such activities. With this direct relief available there is
little justification for injuring a third party via indirect measures.
A second concern of the courts has been that an unreasonable
burden will be placed upon municipal taxpayers if public entities are
allowed to circumvent statutory procedures. However, there is no persuasive evidence that municipal representatives seriously extend the community's liabilities beyond the wishes of its taxpayers.7 3 But if necessary, injunctive relief is available by means of taxpayer actions to prohibit or recover unauthorized public expenditures."
Third, courts have been prone to charge one dealing with a mu75
nicipality with knowledge of the limitations on its power to contract.
With the tremendous volume of litigation concerning the existence of
particular city powers-about which the typical city attorney is in considerable doubt-it seems harsh to impose on a private party, who is
serving the city, the necessity of correctly ascertaining the extent of
69.

See text accompanying notes 72 & 74 infra.

70.
71.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 28 & 36 supra.

72.

See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 803 (West 1955).

73. Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-contractual Responsibilities of Municipal Corporations,2 ST. Louis L.J. 230, 237-38 (1952-53).
74. See Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1942); Greer v.
Hitchcock, 271 Cal. App. 2d 334, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1969).
75. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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municipal power.7'6 This court imposed imputation seems indefensible
when one considers the result. The city, as in Zottman, is unjustly enriched via an illegal contract even though its officials, acting under the
auspices of the charter, would seem to be in a far better position to be
aware of their own contractual limitations.
Under the rationale of Mansell7 7 there is no justification for denying quasi-contractual relief given these alternative remedies since the
public interest need not be sacrificed to alleviate the burden on the individual. In order to allow the equitable remedy, courts, as in Sacramento County,7 8 must find that the party seeking equitable relief acted
in good faith 9 without intention to violate the law. He also must have
had a reasonable belief that the public official had the power to make
the agreement. No evidence of fraud or collusion must be present and,
as seen in Higgens 0 and Breed,81 the public body must have had authority to contract for the subject purpose, and the benefit retained must
be a valid public improvement. In short, the agreement must have
been intra vires or one which the public entity could have entered had
it complied with applicable requirements.
The recovery granted where a contract is invalid for reason of
failure to comply with statutory requirements has invariably been based
on the reasonable value of the benefit retained by the public entity."2
California recognizes the recovery in quantum meruit based on a reasonable value of the benefit conferred. It is a law imposed duty based
on quasi contract when in fact no contract exists. 83 The rationale lies
in the fact that:
The action is based on quasi contract, and it is no defense to such
an action to allege that the parties did not contract. . . . But
the fact remains that a public corporation, like a private individual,
may be liable on a quantum meruit if, having the power to make
a contract, but having made none, it has nevertheless enjoyed the
benefits of work performed or materials furnished to it, when no
statute forbids or deprives it of the power to contract therefor. 84
76. Antieau, supra note 73, at 238.
77. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
79. In Gamewell Co. v. City of Phoenix the court defined good faith as " 'in
the absence of bad faith."' 219 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1955).
80. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
81. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
82. E.g., Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 432, 73 P. 189 (1903);
County of Sacramento v. Southern Pac. Co., 127 Cal. 217, 59 P. 568 (1899); Higgens
v. San Diego Water Co., 118 Cal. 524, 45 P. 824 (1897); Lunden v. County of Los
Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 811, 43 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1965).
83. Palmer v. Gregg, 65 Cal. 2d 657, 660, 422 P.2d 985, 986-87, 56 Cal. Rptr.
97, 98-99 (1967).
84. Antieau, supra note 73, at 232.
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Conclusion
The harsh mandate of Zottman appears to be controlling law in
California today.8 5 Although the decision has not been overruled, the
courts have struggled to escape from its severe results."" Certainly
today, there is no need to subvert individual interests to those of a
public body under the guise of protecting the taxpayer, and hence,
Zottman should be expressly overruled.
It is acknowledged that any viable solution to the problem of the
"unauthorized" public expenditure must not nullify clear legislative intent. However, where the competitive bidding requirement has not
been met, the allowance of quasi-contractual relief where the additional
work was within the power of the municipality will not be inconsistent
with the statutory purpose.8 7 This solution would not dissipate public
funds and would achieve a far more just result than that of the Zottman decision which, at the present time, stands as an obstacle that the
California courts have to side-step to achieve equitable results.
John D. Gage*

85.

See e.g., Greer v. Hitchcock, 271 Cal. App. 2d 334, 76 Cal. Rptr. 376

(1969).
86. See e.g., City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91
Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970); Contra Costa Water Co. v. Breed, 139 Cal. 432, 73 P. 189
(1903); Higgens v. San Diego Water Co., 118 Cal. 524, 45 P. 824 (1897).
87. See text accompanying notes 12 & 13 supra.
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